

# Telesat view on WRC-27 AI 1.5

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**TELESAT**<sup>TM</sup>

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# AI 1.5 WRC-27

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- ▲ The issue originally brought into the attention of WRC-23 is associated with reported challenges faced by some member states in relation to the unauthorized operation of some NGSO user terminals
- ▲ The issue of “unauthorized user terminals operation” is not new. It was studied also during the study cycle leading to WRC-19 **for all types of FSS earth stations** and the outcome was Resolution **22 (Rev WRC-23)**
- ▲ Resolution **25 (Rev WRC-23)** also exists with provisions for MSS
- ▲ Telesat has concerns towards
  - proposals that depart significantly from the provisions and the intent in Res **14 (WRC-23)**
  - excessive technology-biased differentiation in relation to equivalent/same GSO earth station operation – risk to unduly penalize one specific technology

# WRC-27 AI 1.5 - Res 14 (WRC-23)

Resolution **14 (WRC-23)**: Studies on development of regulatory measures, and implementability thereof, to limit the unauthorized operations of non-geostationary-satellite orbit (non-GSO) earth stations in the fixed-satellite service (FSS) and mobile-satellite service (MSS) and associated issues related to the service area of non-GSO FSS and MSS satellite systems:

Resolves 1

- **studies on regulatory measures to limit the unauthorized operations of non-GSO FSS and MSS earth stations in the Earth-to-space direction** in order to address and cease such operations, taking into account technical and operational aspects, as appropriate

Recognizing c)

- **that Member States may wish to exclude its territory from the service area of the non-GSO satellite system**

Resolves 2

- **studies on regulatory measures, taking into account *recognizing c)* with regard to non-GSO FSS and MSS satellite systems, and the implementability of such measures, without adversely affecting the provision of service in the rest of the service area of the non-GSO satellite system**

# Current methods in for the solution of AI 1.5

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## ▲ **Method A:** No Change

All methods below contain measures in relation to *resolves* 1 for

- de-activation of unauthorized non-GSO earth stations
- procedure for reporting of unauthorised operations and actions by the Radiocommunication Bureau and RRB

## ▲ **Method B:** new Resolution. Measures in respect of *resolves* 1 ensure no service provisions in countries where not authorized and, therefore, take care also of *resolves* 2

## ▲ **Method C:** new Resolution. Options for either:

- need for explicit agreement from all countries in the world for inclusion in the service area or
- exclusion at ITU level of the territory of a country from the service area

## ▲ **Method D:** modifications to Resolution 22 (**Rev WRC-23**). Similarly to Method B, measures in respect of *resolves* 1 ensure no service provisions in countries where not authorized and, therefore, take care also of *resolves* 2

# Explicit agreement for “inclusion” of a country’s territory

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- ▲ Method C includes the requirement for each country to provide “explicit agreement” for their territory to be “included” in the service area of a NGSO satellite system
- ▲ Completely different from *Resolves 2/recognizing c* ) “Member States may wish to exclude its territory”
- ▲ The notifying administration of a NGSO system would need to undertake a substantial effort, requiring an action from most countries worldwide, even though many of these nations do not have any issue with NGSO service provision in the first place and may have limited resources. Overall:
  - outside the scope of Resolution **14 (WRC-23)**
  - huge undertaking by the notifying administration
  - will cause administrative delays and gaps in service provision

# Exclusion at ITU level of a country's territory from the service area of a NGSO satellite system

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- ▲ In Method C, provisions for exclusion from the service area are being proposed along the lines of those for GSO planned bands (AP30A and AP30B)
- ▲ Ineffective measure against unauthorized user terminal transmission
- ▲ "Non-GSO service provision" encompasses a variety of services, beside broadband provision to users on land, e.g.:
  - multi-Gbps backhaul connectivity for terrestrial telecom operators,
  - maritime and aeronautical service provision, which is global in nature
- ▲ While it is within the sovereign right of all member states to authorize services in their territories, a full exclusion of a territory from the service area of an NGSO system
  - would render all services unauthorized, thereby also creating gaps in the provision of aeronautical and maritime services
  - would have implications on the protection rights (e.g. if an administration at a later stage would want to be included in the service area, this would likely lead to new coordination requirements for the notifying administration of the satellite system)
- ▲ In practice, service provision can be blocked by adequate measures for Resolve 1

# Differentiation vs earth stations communicating with GSO networks

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- ▲ Additional requirements for NGSO systems will lead to a differentiation from GSO networks for provisions of nearly identical telecommunication services to similar or even the same earth stations
- ▲ Given the ongoing commercial and technical synergies between GSO networks and NGSO systems, reflected also in recent mergers/acquisitions/agreements:
  - there is no longer a physical distinction between “GSO” and “NGSO” FSS user terminals in **multi-orbit operations**
  - user terminals are being designed with the capability of switching between the two types of GSO/NGSO orbits** (e.g. [ThinKom Introduces Ka-Band COTM Phased-Array Satellite Antenna](#))
- ▲ Paradoxical situations in which the same earth station would be subject to more restrictive regulations when transmitting to a NGSO satellite, but relieved from such restrictions when transmitting to a GSO satellite in the same frequencies and from the same location

# Conclusions

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- ▲ Different proposals (explicit agreement for inclusion in the service area) from what was discussed and agreed at WRC-23
- ▲ Unprecedented measures targeting a specific type of satellite system  
-technology-biased Agenda Item
- ▲ Need to strike a balance between the concerns of some Administrations and a fair treatment of all satellite systems/networks
- ▲ Possible additional measures should not adversely affect NGSO service provision, taking into account also global services, such as maritime and aeronautical connectivity
- ▲ Important to analyse potential negative impacts of such measures, including technical feasibility, increased costs and complexity for existing and future satellite systems

# Conclusions (continued)

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- ▲ Overall, there is a need to oppose
  - any departures from WRC-23 agreed provisions
  - concept of explicit agreement for inclusion of the territory of a country
  - exclusion at ITU level of the territory of a country from the service area
  - undue differentiation with respect to the same/similar GSO operation
- ▲ Telesat understands India has proposed method B which is still being developed and many NGSO stakeholders could live with
- ▲ NGSO stakeholders oppose method C, as excessively punitive and discriminatory towards a specific technology. Explicit agreement for inclusion or exclusion at ITU level from the service area will place NGSO systems at a distinctive disadvantage with respect to GSO system, while failing to effectively prevent unauthorized operation
- ▲ Method D is also a valid method, aiming at achieving a similar goal as method B, but starting from existing Resolution 22 instead of a new Resolution

**Thank you!**